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IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF CULT
AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN CHINA:
THE CASE OF FALUN GONG
Anne S.Y. Cheung*
Abstract: Cult and anti-cult movements have been high drama ever since the
close of the twentieth century. The tragedies caused by some minority religious groups
and the corresponding government responses force us to question the meaning of freedom
of religion and to confront our societal conviction to upholding our acclaimed
constitutional values. This Article examines the fundamental concept of freedom of
religion and the tights that it entails in the case of the People's Republic of China.
China's recent crackdown on Falun Gong, a seemingly benign breathing exercise group,
has been bitterly controversial. The case of Falun Gong illustrates that the tension
between cults and states reflects not only the aspirations and frustrations of minority
religious groups, but also the limitations and inadequacies of international human rights
jurisprudence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cult and anti-cult movements have been high drama ever since the
close of the twentieth century. Although the term "cult" remains difficult to
define and sensitive to use,' its connotations are familiar to most of us. The
1995 attempt to gas Tokyo's subway by Aum Shinrikyo shocked not only
Japan, but the entire world. The protest of Falun Gong members who
allegedly set themselves on fire in Beijing in 2000 was a similarly disturbing
and controversial act. Such incidents are not limited to Asia. The mass
suicide-homicides of the Order of the Solar Temple in Canada, Switzerland
and France, and the Waco tragedy in the United States during the 1990s also
alarmed many around the world.
These tragedies have triggered global panic and created a climate of
suspicion regarding cults. In response to these violent events, various
governments blacklisted or banned certain religious groups.2 Among these,
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Some scholars argue that the term cult should be avoided because it is overloaded with negative
stereotypes. See, e.g., James T. Richardson, Definitions of Cult: From Sociological-Technical to Popular-
Negative, 34 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 348, 348 (1993).
2 Examples include France and Belgium, which have blacklisted certain groups as cult or sects and
have established official cult-watching units. For a discussion of government cult prevention and
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the People's Republic of China (the "PRC") stands adamant in its anti-cult
crusade, especially against Falun Gong, a seemingly benign spiritual
exercise group.
Since July 1999, the Chinese government has introduced a series of
legislative reforms and judicial instructions to outlaw cult activities.3 Falun
Gong was eventually banned in October 1999, and by the end of 2002, tens
of thousands of the group's followers were reportedly detained.
Approximately five hundred followers have died in custody from torture or
injury.4 The Falun Dafa Information Centre estimates that by July 2003, as
many as 750 members had died as a result of torture.5 Other group members
were forced to enter labor camps for re-education or were committed to
mental asylums. 6
Human rights groups often Perceive the PRC's crackdown as a serious
violation of freedom of religion despite the fact that Falun Gong denies
being a religious group,8 and that Chinese authorities consider Falun Gong a
cult rather than a religion.9 Under international human rights standards,
freedom of religion is comprised of two fundamental rights: freedom of
religious belief and manifestation of religious belief. 10 While the former is
believed to be an absolute freedom, the latter is viewed as a conditional
regulation, see Massimo Introvigne, Holy Mountains and Anti-Cult Ecology: The Campaign Against the
Aumist Religion in France, 12 Soc. JUST. RES. 365 (1999) and Willy Fautre, Belgium s Anti-Sect War, 12
SOC. JUST. RES. 377 (1999).
3 See infra Part IV.D.
4 Amnesty International, AMNES'Y INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2003 - CHINA at
http://web.armesty.org/report2003/Chn-sunmmary-eng (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
' The Falun Dafa Information Centre, Reports of 5 Deaths of Falun Gong Practitioners Emerge
from Jilin Province, China, July 9, 2003, at http://www.faluninfo.net/displayAnArticle.asp?ID=7584 (last
visited Dec. 1, 2003).
6 For vivid accounts of those who were forced to enter mental asylums, see Robin Munro, Judicial
Psychiatry in China and its PoliticalAbuses, 14 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 105 (2000).
7 See, e.g., B.A. Robinson, Falun Gong and Falun Dafa, Dec. 24, 2001, at
http://www.religioustolerance.org/falungong.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003); Human Rights Watch, U.N.
Asked to Intervene to Protect Falun Gongs Rights, July 22, 1999, at
http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/juVchina2207.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
8 Falun Gong considers itself a qigong, or breathing§ exercise group, which claims to inherit the
wisdom of Buddhism, Taoism, and Chinese qigong. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
9 In October 1999, Chinese authorities first referred Falun Gong as a cult. See Jin Gong Zhi Chujin
Cheng Fei Fa Zu Zhi, Bei Jing Xuan Bu Fa Lun Gong Wei Xie Jiao [The Forbidden Group was First
Referred as an Illegal Association, Beijing Announces it as an Evil Cult] SING TAO DAILY NEWS, Oct. 15,
1999 at http://www.chinainfobank.com (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). For further discussion, see infra Part
IV.C.
1" See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 18, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (providing distinct rights of freedom
of religion and the freedom to manifest one's religion).
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right." In response to international allegations that the PRC is violating
religious freedom, Chinese authorities could state that this right is not
absolute, and that it cannot outweigh other freedoms. Relying on the
formula of human rights balancing, Chinese authorities could easily issue the
well-rehearsed line that freedom of religion will only be respected if it does
not threaten public order, national security, public health 
or morals.' 2
It may be risky, however, for the Chinese government to engage in the
delicate exercise of balancing different types of freedom. This Article
argues that the Chinese government suppresses groups like the Falun Gong
in part because of the rival ideology to state power that they represent.
Chinese authorities' disdain for Falun Gong is reflected by the vocabulary
adopted to label this group. In Chinese, the term "cult" is translated into
"xiejiao," which means evil or perverse doctrines. 13  In labeling certain
groups as cults, the Chinese government condemns the nature of these
groups, and announces that they lead others on a wrong path, blinding their
followers to impartial and sound judgment. From the perspective of the
Chinese government, cults are not religious groups that merit protection.
The fundamental implication of the Chinese government's labeling of
an entity as a cult is that the group's religion becomes deemed illegal or
immoral. Thus, when a group is officially labeled a cult, it is indirectly and
intrinsically stripped of its status as a religious entity, and therefore of its
right to religious freedom. Impliedly, the government also distinguishes
between freedom of belief and freedom of religion. The state asserts that it
has the right to intervene if a religious group distorts one's rational
reasoning and affects one's exercise of mind. From this perspective, when
there is a conflict between the two categories of freedom, freedom of belief
prevails over freedom of religion. What remains unanswered is under what
authority does the state differentiate between religion and belief, and
between cults and legitimate religious groups.
The fate of cults in the Chinese context exposes the inadequacy of the
current human rights regime for protecting minority religious groups. The
legal concept of religious freedom seeks to reconcile personal religious
For further discussion, see infra Part II.
12 Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution stipulates that citizens of the People's Republic of China
shall enjoy freedom of religious belief, but that "no one may make use of religion to engage in activities
that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state."
Chinese authorities consider the teachings of Falun Gong to disrupt social order and to impair the public
health of citizens. See infra Part IVC of this Article and Pitman B. Potter, Belief in Control: Regulation of
Religion in China, CHINA Q. 317, 331-32 (2003).
13 As Vermander notes, the Chinese character "xie" denotes all that is "perverse, unbalanced,
heterodox or pernicious." Benoit Vermander, Looking at China Through the Mirror of Falun Gong, 35
CHINA PERSP. 4, 6 (May-June 2001).
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beliefs and practices with prevailing social norms. In this regard, the murky
distinction between the manifestation of religious practices and religious
beliefs is hardly helpful. Moreover, a state can deny individuals their rights
by outlawing their beliefs as non-religious and labeling their religion a cult.
Therefore, the ultimate legal conundrums in the cult and anti-cult struggle
are appropriately marking the parameters that religious groups enjoy,
defining what constitutes a religion, and determining the final decision-
maker within this discourse.
This Article situates the Falun Gong debate in the context of freedom
of religion within the PRC, and compares it with the general understanding
of freedom of religion and cults within international law. Further, in asking
what a cult is, this Article argues that the term "cult" is a convenient label
'imposed by the ruling authority to signify not the spiritual deviance of a
particular group, but instead its political threat to state power. The debate
over the Falun Gong's status is part of a larger struggle between the PRC's
ideological coherence and the rival belief systems offered by religions. The
Chinese government's current hostile attitude towards Falun Gong further
reveals the precarious position of religion under Communist-Marxist
ideology, and China's long tradition of suspicion regarding the potentially
subversive nature of religious or quasi-religious groups.
This Article begins by examining the definition of religion and the
rights that this specific freedom provides under international law. Part III
discusses the meaning of the term "cult," and the challenge posed to legal
norms by this category. Part IV analyzes the PRC's efforts to categorize
Falun Gong as a cult. This Article concludes that freedom of religion is a
highly political and sensitive issue, in part because the very nature of
religion invites one to recognize a higher source than the state. The Falun
Gong debate not only challenges the ruling Chinese regime, but also the
Western human rights ideology of religious freedom.
II. FREEDOM OF RELIGION: BELIEF VS. MANIFESTATION
Freedom of religion is arguably the oldest of the intemationally
recognized human rights.14 It is enshrined in the Universal Declaration, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European
Convention on Human Rights and the constitutions of various states. 15
14 See David M. Beatty, The Forms and Limits of Constitutional Interpretation, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
79 (2001).
15 Freedom of religion is protected under several international declarations and covenants. See
UDHR, supra note 10; ICCPR, supra note 10; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
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Some trace this conviction to the Enlightenment period, when a strong belief
emerged that an individual's spiritual existence required special protection
by the state, 16 and when one's ability to choose his or her spiritual path
became viewed as central to the struggle against oppression and arbitrary
state power.
Historical recognition of freedom of religion, however, does not
signify that the meaning of religion is clear to scholars in theology,
sociology or law. A 1978 study revealed that there were more than 1200
religious groups in the United States alone.' 7 Various definitions of religion
reflect divergent views of this concept. Some scholars define religion as a
belief in the "conception of a supernatural being, world, or force, and the
notion that the supernatural is active, that events and conditions here on
earth are influenced by the supernatural".' 8 Other scholars emphasize that
internal conviction must be supported by external practice. 19 Within human
rights discourse, religion is generally broadly defined, encompassing
"theistic convictions involving a transcendental view of the universe and a
normative code of behavior, as well as atheistic, agnostic, rationalistic, and
other views in which both elements are absent.,
20
Under international law, the legal definition of religion reflects a
deliberate attempt to avoid an ideological or philosophical challenge
regarding the content of religious beliefs. It refrains from commenting upon
whether religious beliefs are true, acceptable, logical, consistent or
comprehensible. Ninan Koshy, the former director of the Commission on
International Affairs for the World Council of Churches, reminds us that
international human rights instruments are never meant to define religion or
determine the category of believers entitled to state protection. 2' Rather, the
legal concept is designed to delineate the rights attendant to freedom of
religion.
While the content of a particular faith is a personal choice immune
from judicial scrutiny, the exercise of the right is not. In fact, the description
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, GA. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36"' Sess., Supp. No. 51,
art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
16 See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY
312-13 (1993).
17 See J. GORDON MELTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS (1978), quoted in RODNEY
STARK & WILLIAM SIMS BAINBRIDGE, THE FUTURE OF RELIGION 41 (1985).
"8 RODNEY STARK & WILLIAM SIMS BAINBRIDGE, THE FUTURE OF RELIGION 5 (1985).
19 See Jim Stone, A Theory of Religion Revised, 37 RELIGIOUS STUD. 177 (2001); SIR JAMES G
FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH 58 (1922).
20 NATAN LERNER, RELIGION, BELIEFS, AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 119-20 (2000).
21 See NINAN KOSHY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN A CHANGING WORLD 22 (1992).
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of this right is laden with sophisticated meanings and its interpretation is
wrought with difficulty. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (the "ICCPR")2 2 stipulates that "everyone shall have the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 23 This right embraces
"the right to adopt a religion or a belief' and the "right to manifest one's
religion., 24  The ICCPR stresses that "no one shall be subject to coercion
which would impair his freedom"25 in this regard.
The underlying implication of freedom of religion is that the right to
adopt a religion is a personal choice, and that this right creates a
corresponding duty from the state for protection. In carrying out this duty, a
state typically maintains a neutral stance towards religion and abides by the
principle of church-state separation.2 6 This in turn requires the state to
uphold a policy of denominational equality and non-discrimination towards
27
all religious groups. In other words, the state has no power to judge or
22 In full, Article 18 provides that
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as
are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
ICCPR, supra note 10.
23 For a discussion of the nuances between the words "conscience, beliefs and religion," see
Malcolm D. Evans, The United Nations and Freedom of Religion: The Work of the Human Rights
Committee, in LAW AND RELIGION 35, 39 (Rex J. Ahdar ed., 2000). Evans notes that the ICCPR's express
mention of the three terms was intended to protect non-believers from religious fanaticism and to assure the
Soviet bloc that "thought" and "conscience" embraced philosophical and scientific thinking that was not
religious in nature.
24 ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 18(1).
25 See id. art. 18(2).
26 The structural separation of secular and religious authority is not a universal phenomenon.
Perhaps only the United States has strictly adhered to this doctrine. However, this doctrine does not
necessarily require a formal separation between church and state. In Oriental culture, as evidenced in Islam
and Buddhism, there may not be an institutional church. In contrast, due to historical, social and religious
reasons, there are various types of church-state relationships in the West. For instance, some states have
official state religions. Regardless of these differences, a minimum standard is required to protect religious
liberty for all and to prevent discrimination based on religious beliefs. See General Comment of the
Committee on Human Rights in article 18 of the ICCPR. See also ICCPR, supra note 10; Sophie C. van
Bijsterveld, Religion, International Law and Policy in the Wider European Arena: New Dimensions &
Developments, in LAWAND RELIGION 163, 170-71 (Rex J. Ahdar ed., 2000).
2 These are pertinent concerns for the registration of religions and the state support for religions
through tax benefits and non-fmancial mechanisms. See Leszek Lech Garlicki, Perspectives on Freedom of
Conscience and Religion in the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts, 2001 B.YU. L. Rev. 467, 478-79.
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define religious truths. Ideally, this separation acknowledges separate
domains for the church and the state.
As with most rights, the protection of religion is rarely absolute.
Under article 18(3) of the ICCPR, freedom of religion must be balanced
against public safety, order, health, morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others.28 For our present purpose, it is not necessary to engage
in the delicate exercise of this balancing, but rather to note that proper
limitations must not be aimed at circumventing one's right to religion. The
intention of this balancing is instead to restrict religious conduct that
conflicts with others' rights. A distinction is thus drawn between religious
belief and its corresponding conduct, including forms of worship,
observance, proselytizing, and teaching. The manifestation of religion is
under the minute scrutiny of the state, making it a fertile ground for
litigation. Famous cases involving religious practices include Amish parents
who refused to send their children to state schools, 29 believers who insisted
on the use of marijuana in ritual worship,30 and Christians who transported
Bibles into countries that forbid the practice of Christianity.
31
As the examples above illustrate, the distinction between religious
beliefs and manifestation of such beliefs is often artificial. Religious beliefs
often require specific doctrinal practices. Furthermore, it is impossible to
strip the public dimension from religion; one cannot deny "the social,
institutional and communicative aspects of religion. 32 Believers often share
their faith together and organize themselves in accordance to their religious
precepts. As a result, interpreting religious belief as a purely internal,
private and personal conviction denies the reality that such "inner freedom
See Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, supra note 15, art. 2 (specifically prohibiting discrimination by the state). For further discussion,
see Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through the U.N. Declaration on the
Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 487 (1988).
28 See supra note 22.
29 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
30 MAB, WAT and J-AYI v. Canada, Comm No. 570/1993 at
http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/IIHRL/1994/35.htm.
3 For example, in May 2001, a Hong Kong businessman, Lai Kwong-keung, transported more than
16,000 Bibles and other publications from Hong Kong into China for an underground Christian group
called the "Shouters." See Greg Torode & Stella Lee, Don't Meddle, China Tells U.S. in Bibles Row, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 9, 2002, at 1. China does not allow the distribution of Bibles without
permission. Id. The Christian duty of spreading the gospel was not accepted by Chinese authorities. Id.
Lai was sentenced to two years imprisonment, but was later released for health reasons. Id.
32 van Bijsterveld, supra note 26, at 175. For instance, many religions require their followers to
worship in temples or in churches, which carries institutional, social and communicative dimensions.
Julian Rivers also argues that freedom of religion entails a collective aspect in which religious association
should be endowed with a set of rights, immunities, privileges and powers. See Julian Rivers, Religious
Liberty as a Collective Right, in 4 LAW AND RELIGION: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2001, 227 (Richard O'Dair
& Andrew Lewis eds., 2001).
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can only be expressed through external manifestation., 33 Religious beliefs
and the manifestation of such beliefs are two sides of the same coin, often
impossible to disentangle. Logically, in proscribing religious practices, the
state in turn invalidates the integrity of such beliefs.
III. CULTS AND THE CHALLENGES THEY POSE TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES
The distinction between religious beliefs and practices plays a crucial
role in the debate regarding cults. Not only have the activities of certain
groups become the subject of intense criticism, but the groups themselves
have also come under direct scrutiny. For instance, the Chinese government
objects to the existence and organization of groups that it labels sects or
cults. 34 In doing so, state authorities pierce the boundaries of purported
religious neutrality, violating the principles of equality and non-
discrimination of religious groups. Logically, the act of balancing religious
activities with other state concerns and human rights is unlikely to be carried
out in an impartial manner. Before delving into the legal concepts of
neutrality, equality and balancing, it is necessary to examine the meaning of
the term "cults."
A. The Meaning of "Cults"
The terms "cult" and "sect" often conjure negative images. Despite
its connotations, "cult" can be a neutral term that is used commonly in
sociological and political studies.35 The term "cult" can be defined as "a
community of individuals constituting a minority within a religion that
decided to split from that religion. 36 A distinction between cults and sects
may be drawn by defining sects as organizations that have former ties with a
religious body, while cults are newly established groups. 37  Under this
definition, both groups are deviant religious bodies that are "in a state of
33 KOSHY, supra note 21, at 24.
34 Before the rise of Falun Gong, Chinese authorities had been wary of different groups with strong
religious and political overtones, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang. See Potter supra note 12, at 322. Folk
religions have also been suppressed in rural villages. See Lung Jing Yu, Xin Zhong Guo Dui Hui Dao Men
De Dou Zheng [The Struggle of New China Against Hui Dao Men], in FA LUN GONG YU XIE JIAo [FALUN
GONG AND CULT], 213-14 (Chen Hong Xing & Dai Chen Jing eds., 1999).
35 Because law is not supposed to rule on the specific content of religious dogma, as discussed in
Part II, strictly speaking "cult" is not a legal term. Nevertheless, as shown within this Article, the term
bears significant legal implications.
36 LERNER, supra note 20, at 7.
31 See STARK & BAINBRIDGE, supra note 18, at 25.
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relatively high tension with their surrounding socio-cultural environment." 38
In other words, they are marginal groups that form a social subculture. The
modem terms "new religious groups," "emergent religious groups" or
"minority religious groups" are perhaps less judgmental descriptions of the
nature of cults.
Bizarre as they may seem to the outsider, cults do not necessarily
reflect the "evilness" assumed in Chinese language. 39  The term "cult"
denotes only the level of contemporary social acceptance towards certain
groups. In fact, many mainstream religions were yesterday's cults when
they were first founded. Prominent religious leaders like Augustine, Martin
Luther, and John Calvin did not share the religious views of those in power
and were regarded as deviant figures in their day.40 The definition and
perception of a cult varies by time and place. Indeed, today's cults may one
day become mainstream religions.
Despite the neutral historical meaning of a cult as a marginal religious
group, the implication of perversion that is often attributed to cults should
not be overlooked. In essence, the word "cult" signifies a lack of acceptance
and level of tension between a minority religious group and society at large.
Cults are groups that reject societal norms and are also rejected by society.
In its mildest form, these groups may be seen as mystical or idiosyncratic.
However, when antagonism escalates, these groups may become
troublesome and undesirable in the eyes of the majority.4  A single tragedy
or egregious example of fraud may especially distort the popular conception
of cults.
42
A definition of cult has emerged in contemporary culture, as
understood by most in society and within the media. The following traits
characterize groups commonly viewed as cults:
38 id.
39 See Vermander, supra note 13.
40 See FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 4-5 (1977).
41 The elements of being mystical, idiosyncratic and undesirable are the marks of subculture
deviance in sociological studies. See STARK & BAINBRIDGE, supra note 18, at 49.42 Gruesome examples of cult tragedies include Aurn Shinrikyo's 1995 release of nerve gas into
Tokyo subway, which killed twelve people and injured 6000. The Japanese government used public funds
to purchase property owned by the group and refused to allow group members to register as residents. See
Center for New Studies on New Religions, at http://www.cesnur.org/2003/aum-01.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2003). Reverend Moon of the Unification Church (the Moonies) was convicted by the U.S. Court for tax
evasion.
The bias against religious sects may also result in wrongful convictions. Three members of the
Ananda Marga group were wrongfully convicted for planning the Hilton bombing in Australia, and spent
seven years in jail. The notorious case of Lindy Chamberlain involved a Seventh Day Adventist who was
convicted of murdering her own child, and was found innocent only after spending three years in prison.
For discussion of the last three examples, see James Richardson, Minority Religions ("Cults") and the Law:
Comparisons of the United States, Europe, and Australia, 18 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 183, 188-99 (1995).
JANUARY 2004
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
1. relatively newly-formed groups that present a distinct alternative to
dominant patterns, and perceive themselves as elitist societies;
2. strong authoritarian and charismatic leadership, in which the
founding leader is often self-appointed and not accountable to the
members;
3. aggressive proselytizing methods and use of psychological methods
to recruit and indoctrinate its members;
4. systematic inducement of powerful experiences and fulfillment of
members' personal needs;
5. a strong sense of "insiders" and "outsiders" and a high degree of
conformity and commitment;
6. a tendency to see themselves as legitimated by a long tradition of
wisdom of practice of which they are the current manifestation;
7. a lack of benefit to members or the society from the wealth gathered
by such groups.43
These widely perceived beliefs regarding cults are not without
problems. Obviously, terms such as "indoctrination," "psychological
manipulation" and "authoritarian leadership" are vague and §difficult to
define. These characteristics can be found within many religious groups that
are not considered cults. Despite the difficulty in establishing a
comprehensive definition, one scholar posits that "it is this popular use of
the term [that] has gained such credence and momentum that it has virtually
swallowed up the more neutral historical meaning of the term from the
sociology of religion."44 Furthermore, due to its loaded meaning, those in
authority may easily use the term "cult" as a social weapon against groups
that they consider threatening.45
B. Cults and Challenges Within the Legal Arena
When the tension between cults and mainstream society reaches such
a level that a government decides to persecute cult activities or even to
41 These characteristics are a combination of the definitions articulated by Ellwood, Robins and
Anthony and the Cult Information Centre. See Robert Ellwood, The Several Meanings of Cult, THOUGHT
LXI (241):212-24; T. Robbins & D. Anthony, Deprogramming, Brainwashing and the Medicalization of
Deviant Religious Groups, 29 Soc. PROB. 283-97, quoted in James T. Richardson, Definitions of Cult.
From Sociological-Technical to Popular-Negative, 34 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 348, 351 (1993). See Cult
Information Centre, Wat is a Cult?, at http://www.cultinformation.org.uk/faq.htil (last visited Dec. 1,
2003).
4 Richardson, supra note 1, at 348.
41 Id. at 352.
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outlaw certain groups, the protection of religious freedom should be at its
height. The distinction between freedom of religious belief and
manifestation of this belief, both of which are core constituents of the right
to freedom of religion, is crucial. Yet, under this scenario, the category of
"religious freedom" becomes incoherent. Innocuous beliefs and practices
are proscribed as dangerous, and state protection is withdrawn. Although
manifestations of religious beliefs are subject to restriction by the state, as
discussed in Part II, the state must determine the appropriate scope of such
limitations. Specifically, when members of a religious group practice their
faith in an objectionable manner, can the state condemn that group as a cult
and outlaw the group on the basis of its belief?
International human rights jurisprudence indicates that a state lacks
such authority. Under international law, "religion" is a "purely factual and
nonjudgmental description, ' 46 that is premised on equality and neutrality. If
freedom of religion is not contingent upon the objective truth of a specific
belief, cults should not exist as a legal category under international human
rights standards. The principle of religious freedom requires that all
religions be treated equally before the law. The principle of neutrality also
minimizes the extent to which the state can encourage or discourage any
religious belief. Within this analytic framework, "discrimination is carried
to the extreme when the law declares religions or denominations to be
unlawful. 47
When a state imposes this narrow concept of religious freedom, it may
deliberately do so to describe certain groups as illegitimate cults, and thus
unworthy of protection. Once branded a cult, the state nullifies that group's
beliefs, despite the state's theoretical duty to remain neutral with respect to
the content of the belief system in question. Under this binary approach, a
state can suppress genuine spiritual beliefs and practices by labeling groups
cults, such that they fall outside the official category of "religion."
No one would deny that some past cult activities have amounted to
disturbing and immoral criminal acts. Rather than categorically banning
marginal groups, governments would be better served by monitoring, or
outlawing if necessary, the harmful activities of these religious
organizations. This is the policy adopted by the European Union (the
"EU"). In its 1996 Resolution on Cults in Europe, the EU differentiated
cults and new religious movements from religions and sects.48 While the EU
46 STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPAL OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 80 (1995).
47 KOSHY, supra note 21, at46.
48 European Union Preparatory Acts, Resolution on Cults in Europe, Official Journal C78, Mar. 18,
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failed to define "cult," it clearly warned members to guard against the
intolerable activities of such groups. Objectionable activities listed by the
EU include "maltreatment, sexual abuse, unlawful detention, slavery, the
encouragement of aggressive behavior, propagation of racist ideologies, tax
fraud, illegal transfers of funds, trafficking in arms or drugs, violation of
labor law and the illegal practice of medicine. ' 49 The EU stopped short of
calling for a complete ban of cults, thereby beginning to move beyond the
binary opposition of religions and cults. Under this structure, all religious
groups, whether marginal or mainstream, enjoy state protection of their
beliefs and practices, unless their activities themselves prove harmful.
Despite this ideal, many nations resort to overarching bans on certain
minority religious groups. Pragmatically, a state may consider it more
efficacious to outlaw an entire group because of the objectionable and
harmful activities that the state believes to inherently stem from the group's
doctrine. When a state declares a cult a non-religious group, as the French
and Chinese governments have done, ° these groups are not provided with
the protections guaranteed under the concept of freedom of religion.
Inevitably, one cannot escape scrutinizing the activities, the nature and the
beliefs of certain groups. Freedom of religion may then be reduced to a
narrow and restricted concept, as is the case in the PRC.
IV. CHINA: FREEDOM OF RELIGION - BUT WHAT RELIGION?
The problem of Falun Gong is only a recent instance of the ruling
Chinese authority adopting an intolerant stance towards an emergent
1996. Article 9 stipulates that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or its
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedom of others.
49 Id. para. E.
50 In 1998, the French government established the Mission to Fight Cults. In 2001, the French Anti-
Cult Law prohibited the existence of 170 religious groups. See Massimo Introvigne, Holy Mountains and
Anti-Cult Ecology: The Campaign Against the Aumist Religion in France, 12 SOC. JUST. RES. 363 (1999).
The French Anti-Cult Law was adopted on May 30, 2001. English translation of the law can be found on
the website of Center for Studies on New Religions, at http://www.cesnur.org/2001/fr law en.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2003). Similarly, the Communist Party of China has long operated a registration system for
religious groups. Since 1999, the Chinese government has enacted a series of legislative reforms and
judicial instructions to outlaw cult activities and ban certain groups. Detailed discussion of the Chinese
position is covered in Part IV. Arguably, the U.S. government has also adopted the extreme approach of
outlawing cults. See Richardson, supra note 42.
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religious group. This approach can partly be attributed to patterns in
Chinese history and Marxist-Communist teachings that disavow the
existence of a transcendent spiritual realm. 51 One common ambition shared
by Chinese rulers, ancient and new, is to contain and control new religious
groups, and if necessary, to uproot them in their early formative days. 52 The
Chinese Communist Party's (the "CCP's") response to Falun Gong is one
consistent with China's experience.
A. Lasting Lessons from History
Scholars have argued that the CCP's desire to gain total control over
religious activity stems from a deep-rooted fear and keen awareness that
religious groups, especially quasi-religious or popular religious groups, often
have potentially subversive power.53 The danger of religious groups to the
political order is particularly worrisome because spiritual leaders and
religious beliefs have played powerful roles in mobilizing rebel forces.
Further, protests often take the form of popular "cross-class" and "cross-
territorial" campaigns.54 Religious groups do not merely advocate for
emancipation from the material world, but also often promote an alternative
order of righting wrongs in present social systems.
The perceived threat of religion within China pre-dates the Maoist
era. 55 Chinese history is replete with examples of uprisings with religious
overtones that are often motivated by political concerns. The Taiping
Rebellion in 1850 and the Boxer Uprising in 1900 cost the Qing Dynasty
dearly, and eventually contributed to its downfall. 56 In the fourteenth
51 See Alan Woods, Marxism and Religion, at
http://www.marxist.com/Theory/marxism_and_religion.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
52 See David A. Graff, State Making and State Breaking, in A MILITARY HISTORY OF CHINA 39
(David A. Graff& Robin Higham eds., 2002); C. K. YAN, RELIGION IN CHINESE SOCIETY 218-43 (1961).
53 See, e.g., Elizabeth Perry, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Popular Protest in Modern China,
33 CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 163 (2001); Kelly Thomas, Falun Gong: An Analysis of China s National
Security Concerns, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 471, 484-89 (2001).
54 Perry, infra note 53, at 169.
55 The Han Dynasty was troubled by the Taoist Yellow Turban rebellion, the Yuan (the Mongols), the
White Lotus Group and various other religious sects. For an interesting account, see Graff, supra note 52;
YAN, infra note 52.
56 Both the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer Uprising were social movements that were militaristic
in nature and reflected religious fanaticism. The Taiping Rebellion lasted from 1850 to 1864, raging over
sixteen Chinese provinces, destroying more than 600 cities and causing the death of at least 25 million
people. The Taiping Group was led by Hong Xiuquan, who claimed to receive visions from God and to be
the brother of Jesus. Hong established himself as the Heavenly King, attracting many followers in a time
when China was plagued by foreign invasions, natural disaster, widespread political corruption and
economic hardship. Hong was able to gather a revolutionary army, with the main goal of toppling the
Manchu government. Due to internal rivalry, the Taiping forces eventually fell apart and lost to the
Imperial forces. For details, see IMMANUELCY. HSU, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 221-49 (2000). After
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century, Zhu Yuanzhang, the first Emperor of the Ming Dynasty, was a
mendicant monk and a member of the militant religious group the White
Lotus Sect before coming to power.57 After he became Emperor, he quickly
outlawed the White Lotus group and other popular religious sects, forcing
them underground. 58  Since the Ming Dynasty, cults and quasi-religious
sects have often been banned under Chinese criminal law.
59
Chinese uprisings often began as patriotic movements against
invaders, 60 or as revolts against an oppressive internal government. 61 These
uprisings often proved devastating at the declining period of a dynasty. The
fact that religious responses to societal and political problems may easily be
transformed into political opposition movements has imparted important
lessons upon the modem Chinese government. The elaborate scheme of
control devised by the CCP has its roots in the Nationalist KMT
Government (Guomindang). A common ideology between both regimes is
that an anti-religion movement is necessary to stamp out superstition and to
push for modernization.
Sun Yat-sen, the founder of modem China and himself a Christian,
was careful to provide a clear demarcation between the state and the
the Taiping era, China continued to suffer under foreign imperialism and the incompetence of the
Manchurian government.
Against this background, the Boxers quickly came to power. The Boxers were known as Yi-he
Quan, the "Righteous and Harmonious Fists," because their members practiced old-style calisthenics. The
Boxers appealed to a superstitious populace, practiced magic arts, and claimed to be immune to bullets.
Instead of opposing the Qing dynasty, the Boxers blamed foreigners and their Chinese collaborators. With
this approach, the Boxers attracted a large following and were eventually entrusted by the Manchurian
court to fight foreign troops. In 1900, thinking that they could rely on the mystical power of the Boxers,
the Manchurian court declared war on foreign forces in China. Ironically, this action hastened the downfall
of the Qing Dynasty and worsened the scramble of concessions by foreign forces in China. The Eight
Allied Forces (Japan, Russia, Britain, the U.S., France, Austria, Italy, and Germany) charged into Beijing
and forced China§ to sign various unequal treaties. For a colorful account, see DIANA PRESTON, THE
BOXER REBELLION (2000).
51 The White Lotus Sect was fu.t organized about A.D. 1250 during the Yuan dynasty when China
was ruled by the Mongol dynasty. The group dedicated itself to overthrowing foreign rule and to restoring
the leadership of the Han race.
58 Dung Xiao Han and Zhou Yi Wen, Ming Qing Min Jian De Jin Ben Te Dian Ji Zheng Fu De Chu
Zhi Cuo Shi [The Basic Characteristics of Popular Religious Groups in Ming and Qing Dynasty and
Government Policy], in FALUN GONG YU XIAN JIAO [FALUN GONG AND CULT] 216, 220 (Chen Hong Xing
& Dai Chen Jing eds., 1999).
59 Id.
60 This phenomenon was evidenced by the attempts to overthrow the Mongols and the Manchus.
Similarly, the Boxer Uprising was directed against Westerners.
6' Toward the end of the Han dynasty, there were two great Taoist rebellions against the government
and the Yellow Turbans: one in 184 B.C. and the other in 189 B.C. Between 477 and 535 A.D., during the
reign of Northern Wei, there were eight attempts at armed rebellion led by Buddhists in less than sixty years.
Even during the Tang dynasty, the conflict between Buddhist monks and the ruling regime over taxation
and conscription was a top governmental concern. See YANG, supra note 52, at 112.
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church.62 Subsequent leaders of the KMT regime, however, feared and
resented religious groups. These feelings were due in part to the widely held
perception that foreign missionary groups in China were convenient tools for
the infiltration of Western imperialism and militarism.63  Another factor
explaining governmental hostility towards religious groups was that rural
areas were dominated by quasi-religious and folk religious groups.
Accordingly, significant resources were beyond the reach of the new
government. General Yuan Shikan, having assumed power in 1912 after
Sun relinquished his rule, was determined to uproot the institutional
foundations of religion in rural villages in the name of modernization and
eradication of superstition. 64  When the Nationalist Government regained
control in 1927, it continued its drive to end superstition and to wipe out
popular religious or quasi-religious groups.
65
What survives under the contemporary PRC Criminal Code is not
only the concept of the cult but also the unique term "hui dao men," 66 which
is often translated as secret society, superstitious society or triad. First used
in the mid-Ming dynasty, 67 this term signifies and embodies two different
types of organizations. "Hui men" refers to quasi-religious groups with a
militant nature. These groups are secret militant and political organizations
with religious overtones. These groups practice martial arts, believe in
supernatural forces and rely on magic spells and charms. "Dao men," on the
other hand, refers to groups that rely on prayers and superstitious practices.68
These are secret religious organizations with a nationalistic cast. Despite the
fact that "hui dao men" may have a different meaning in modern times, the
continued use of this term reflects the militant nature and subversive
potential of certain religious groups within the PRC.
Although the CCP only currently allows five religious orders,69 the
KMT devised a classification system that defined and bound the arena for
62 See discussion in PRASENJITDUARA, RESCUING HISTORY FROM THE NATION 99 (1995).
613 See id. at 103-4.
6 For example, in Ding county of Zhili province, the number of temples declined from 432 in 1900
to 116 in 1915. Id. at97.
65 Decrees were passed to outlaw certain practices. See, e.g., Fei Chu Bu Shi Xing Xiang Wu Shi Kan
Yu Ban Fa [The Procedure for the Abolition of the Occupations of Divination, Astrology, Physiognomy and
Palmistry, Magic and Geomancy] was passed in 1929. See also Qu Di Jing Ying Mi Xin Wu Pin Ye Ban Fa
[Measures on Suppressing the Operation of Selling Superstitious Goods]. A decree ordering those who
sold superstitious merchandise to change their occupation was passed in 1930. See 4 COLLECTIONS OF THE
LAWS OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC [ZHONGHUA MIN GUO FA GUI Hui BIEN] 794-96 (1933).
66 See Criminal Code of the People's Republic of China [C. CRIM.] art. 300 (Fr.).
67 See Lung Jing Yu, Xin Zhong Guo Dui Hui Dao Men De Dou Zheng [The Struggle of New China
Against Hui Dao Men], in FALUN GONG AND CULT, supra note 58, at 212-13.
68 d
69 See infra text accompanying note 103.
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"true religious worship." 70  In general, temples dedicated to sages and
worthy men of the past were permitted, while temples dedicated to
legendary deities and animistic spirits were suppressed. 7' By the 1930s,
altars to wind, rain, mountains and rivers had largely disappeared. 72 Popular
religious groups, such as the Boxers, the White Lotus, the Red Spears, and
the Small and Big Sword societies, were outlawed as cults because they used
magic and charms. In addition, all temples had to be registered and their
management monitored by state officials.73 Registration of all religious
bodies, their leaders, places of activities, and their finances was also
required.74 In addition to targeting popular religion, the KMT government
was equally rigorous in overseeing religious activities in the cities and
guarding against the spread of Christianity.75 All universities, including
Christian institutions, were required to register with the Nationalist
Government. 76 Religious writings were forbidden from display in the library
of any religiously sponsored schools.77 National law regulated Bible reading
within schools 7 and many Christians were barred from governmental
positions because of their faith.79
This large-scale campaign was done in the name of modernization,
secularization and science. Yet Prasenjit Duara, a distinguished Chinese
historian, argues that the hidden intention of the Nationalist Government was
most likely to displace power from religious groups, especially in the
70 See Prasenjit Duara, Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of Modernity: The Campaigns
Against Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-Century China, 50 J. OF ASIAN STUD. 67 (1991).71 Although temples dedicated to Confucius were allowed, annual commemoration ritual dedicated
to him was outlawed. See Fei Zhi Si Kong Jiu Dian Ling [Abolishing of Rites to Confucius], in 12
COLLECTIONS OF THE LAWS OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC [ZHONGHUA MIN Guo FAGUI Hui BIEN] 155 (1933)
(enacted 1929). Explanation of various gods and deities was contained in the law book, and their status of
"legitimacy" under the KMT regime was also stated. See Zong Jiao Si Miao [Religion Temples], in 4
COLLECTIONS OF THE LAWS OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC [ZHONGHUA MIN GuO FA Gui Hui BIEN] 807-27
(1933) (enacted 1929).
YANG, supra note 52, at 367.
13 Laws on the Monitoring of Temples, in 4 COLLECTIONS OF THE LAWS OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC
814 (1933) (enacted 1930); Si Miao Deng Ji Tlao Li [Laws on the Registration of Temples], in 4
COLLECTIONS OF THE LAWS OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 814 (1933) (enacted 1929).
74 See YEARBOOK OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR [NEI ZHEN NIAN BU] 13248 (1936)
(containing a list and details of various religious organizations).
75 DUARA, supra note 62, 103-04.
76 WING TSIT CHAN, RELIGIOUS TRENDS IN MODERN CHINA 169 (1953).
77 Jiao Hui Xue XiaoTu Shu Guan Bu De Chen Lie Zong Jiao Shu Bao Ling [Decree on NotAllowing Missionary Schools to Display Religious Books and Periodicals], in 9 COLLECTIONS OF THE
LAWS OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC [ZHONGHUA MIN GOO FA GUI HUI BIEN] 175-78, (1933) (enacted 1932).
78 Cha Jiao Hui Xue Xiao Ying Xing Zhu N1 Ge Dian [Points to be Noted When Inspecting
Missionary Schools], in 9 COLLECTIONS OF THE LAWS OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC [ZHONGHUA MIN Guo FA.
GUI HUi BIEN] 175-78 (1933).
79 CHAN, supra note 76, at 169.
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powerful local villages.8° In particular, state control over revenues generated
from religious properties allowed the government to extend its grip over the
collective property and resources of rural villages.81 Temples' income and
properties were often confiscated to relieve the financial stringency of the
government.
82
When the CCP established the PRC in 1949, it inherited the KMT's
anti-religious sentiment and refined its administrative system to strictly
govern religious activities. 83 Despite the differences in scale and extent of
control over religious affairs between the KMT and CCP regime, the CCP
government proved equally eager to gain total political dominance over
religion. The CCP devised a registration system for religious groups and a
policing system to oversee religious affairs.84 One commentator remarked
that freedom of religion in the PRC is better understood as "religion
management, ' '85 in which state dominance over religion is beyond dispute.
B. China's Marxist Socialist Style of Religion Management
One may wonder why the PRC, as a communist state, would allow
any religious freedom. It is indeed true that from a Marxist perspective,
religion is the "opiate of the masses" and that religion is antagonistic to the
fundamental nature of socialist atheism. However, realizing that it is
impossible to eliminate all religious beliefs, the CCP conceded that religion
must be tolerated as an inevitable consequence of human civilization and of
China's long historical march to a communist utopian state.86 Hence,
boundaries of tolerance are clearly marked. Religion is allowed only if it
so Duara, supra note 70, at 79.
81 DUARA, supra note 62, 97-98.
82 See YANG, supra note 52, at 368.
83 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
84 The Bureau of Religious Affairs of the State Council is responsible for overseeing all religious
matters. The Religious Affairs Department is responsible for monitoring religious matters at provincial
levels.
85 Liu Peng, Church and State Relations in China: Characteristics and Trends, in CHURCH & STATE
REL. IN 21sr CENTURYASIA41, 55 (Beatrice Leung, ed., 1996).
86 For example, under the Regulations on the Administration of Sites for Religious Activities (Decree
No. 145 of the State Council of the PRC, Jan. 31, 1994), all religious activities must be conducted at
registered sites and must conform to laws and regulations. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, CHINA:
STATE CONTROL OF RELIGION 11 (1997), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/C/CHINA/CHINA9
7 0
.PDF
(last visited Dec. 1, 2003). The Chinese government has promulgated the Provisions on the Administration
of Religious Activities of Aliens within the Territory of the People's Republic of China (Order of the State
Council of the PRC, No. 144, Jan. 31, 1994), under which foreigners must comply when practicing their
religion in China. Registration Procedures for Venues for Religious Activities (Religious Affairs Bureau of
the State Council, May 1, 1994) stipulates the detailed rules and process applicable to religious sites and
individual practitioners. Id.
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does not disturb political stability and economic development. As early as
1982, before the problem of Falun Gong arose, the CCP announced that
religion should always be in line with Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism,
8 7
and subject to the approval of the CCP leadership and to registration by
government officials.
88
Consequently, the PRC's demarcation between the state and the
church is understood in a very different manner from the established
doctrine under international legal jurisprudence. As addressed in Part II, the
doctrine of separation of church and state implies that the state should
abstain from ruling on the content of religious truths.8 9 Although it may not
be the primary interest and intent of the Chinese government to substantiate
the content of any specific religion, religious groups are undoubtedly
subordinate to the CCP leadership. Under Chinese rule, religion should
never interfere with state administration, including the judiciary and state
education.
90
Similarly, although freedom of religion is enshrined in the Chinese
Constitution, its understanding is different from the international standard. 91
Since 1982, freedom of religious belief has been protected under article 36
of the Chinese Constitution.92 Prima facie, the wording and style of article
36 closely resembles article 18 of the ICCPR, which provides the right to
religion and provides certain limitations on governmental action. 93 Upon
s' Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Guan Yu Wo Guo She Hui Zhu i Shi Qi Zong
Jiao Wen T De Ji Ben Guan Dian He ii Ben Zheng Ce [Concerning the Fundamental Perspectives and
Basic Policies on Religious Matters in my Country During the Socialist Period, March 1982], SAN ZHONG
QUAN HuI Yi LAI ZHONG YAO WEN JIAN XUAN BIAN [IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS SINCE THE THIRD PLENARY
SESSION OF THE ELEVENTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY] 1125 (SHANGHAI:
PEOPLE'S PRESS 1982) [hereinafter IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS].
88 The Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council is responsible for monitoring the registration of
religious organizations, venues for religious activities, religious training, selection of clergy, publication of
religious publications and funding for religious activities. Id. at 1238.
89 KOSHY, supra note 21.
90 IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS, supra note 87, at 1126.
91 Although China has signed the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights in October 1998, it has not ratified the instrument. For a record of the status of ratification
of U.N. human tights treaties as of November 2003 see the U.N. website at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
92 See P.R.C. CONST. art. 36 (1993), available at http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prccon93.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2003).
93 Article 36 states:
(1) Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.
(2) No state organ, public organization, or individual may compel citizens to believe in,
or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who
believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.
(3) The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to
engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere
with the educational system of the state.
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closer examination, however, it is evident that the Chinese wording and
understanding differs from that within the international instrument.
First, article 36(1) of the Chinese Constitution states that "the citizens
of the People's Republic of China enjoy the freedom of religious belief," but
not freedom of religion as a whole. It is not clear whether the adoption of
the term "freedom of religious belief' is deliberate. Following the logic of
article 18 of the ICCPR, religious beliefs only refer to the private realm of
religious thought, conscience, and belief.94 Any exercise outside this realm
is subject to state scrutiny.
Second, under article 36(3), the Chinese Constitution does not protect
the manifestation of religion. The state only protects "normal religious
activities." 95 No one can make use of religion to "disrupt public order,
impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the
state."96 Seemingly, this provision is similar to article 18(3) of the ICCPR,
where balancing of rights and other concerns are built into the legal
instrument.97 However, under the Chinese Constitution, religious activities
must fulfill the threshold requirement of being "normal" before they can
claim any protection. Thus, the scope of protection is much narrower under
the Chinese Constitution than under the ICCPR.
In addition, article 36(4) forbids foreign domination of religious
bodies or their affairs.98 The CCP fears that religious or missionary groups
may be used to disguise infiltration by foreign powers. 99 Religious groups
could conceivably engage in espionage and counterrevolutionary acts that
endanger state interests, harm the life and property of citizens, and propagate
superstition. 100 The paramount concern of the CCP is to strengthen its
leadership, as demonstrated by the fact that "it is forbidden to use religion to
oppose the CCP's leadership and the socialist system, to undermine the unity




The Chinese government prescribes only five religions from which
their citizens may choose:l°2 Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Protestantism,
(4) Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.
Id. art. 36.
94 KOSHY, supra note 21.
95 P.R.C. CONST. art 36(3) (1993).
96 id.
97 ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 18(3).
98 P.R.C. CONST. art. 36(4) (1993).
99 IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS, supra note 87, at 1236-37.
'00 Id. at 1235, 1237.
'o' Id. at 1238.
102 Id.
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and Islam. 103 This limitation of choices, rather than a complete ban on
religious worship and activities, may be seen as a compromise by the ruling
authorities. It may also be viewed as a choice to grant basic recognition and
minimum protection to organized religions. Yet this system also facilitates
the monitoring of religious groups and activities. The more established and
organized a religious institution is, the easier it is for the state to exercise
control.
At the national level, the Bureau of Religious Affairs of the State
Council oversees all religious matters, including control of religious
organizations' 0 4 At the provincial municipal levels, the Religious Affairs
Department assumes these responsibilities.'°5 Thus, the timing, the size, and
the frequency of religious activities are under the supervision of state
departments.1
06
Despite official recognition of the five religions, the Chinese
government discourages and at times suppresses the "underground" sects
within these religions. For instance, the "Patriotic Church" of Catholicism is
the lawful church in the PRC, while the "underground church" is considered
illegal because it insists that the Pope is its leader.10 7 Similarly, the "Three-
Self Churches" of Protestantism are officially recognized, while the "house
churches" hold uhofficial private meetings with their "self-proclaimed
evangelists."'' 08 Freedom of religion as a personal belief is accorded little
weight within this framework because the manifestation of religious beliefs
must conform to the government's administrative scheme. The quarantine
of religions into five denominations and the distinction between legitimate
"high" churches and underground "low" churches further illustrates that
religion is a highly malleable concept designed to give Chinese authorities
maximum latitude in suppressing subversive religions and maintaining state
control.
103 Id. at 1236. Only five religions are endorsed under different provincial regulations. See Shang
Hai Shi Zong Jiao Shi Wu Tiao Li [Shanghai City Religious Affairs Regulations], at
http://www.chinainfobank.com/lrisBin/Text.dll?db-FL&no=l 1235&cs=l 5047812&str-) (last visited Dec.
1, 2003). The Heilongjiang Province also includes Orthodox Christianity, see Zong Jiao Shi Wu Hei Long
Jiang Sheng Zong Jiao Shi Wu Guan Li Tiao Li [Heilongiiang Province Religious Affairs Regulations], at
http://www.chinainfobank.com/IrisBin/Text.dll?db=FL&no=16682&cs=13969847&str= (last visited Dec.
1,2003).
'" IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS, supra note 87, at 1230.
105 Id.
106 id.
107 Liu Peng, supra note 85, at 47.
08 Id.
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C. The Challenge Posed by Falun Gong
Given concerns about social stability and the ideological coherence of
the Marxist state, the rise of Falun Gong from a seemingly benign group
founded in 1992 to a well-organized and highly efficient force in 1999
alarmed the CCP leadership. 10 9 As discussed above, the PRC's intolerance
of religious sects is historically consistent with China's past. 110 The rise of
Falun Gong must, however, also be understood in the context of the
economic and political reforms of post-Mao China."1 ' Although Chinese
society has become more affluent, the gap between the rich and the poor has
also widened. The gradual economic restructuring and withdrawal of state
funding for health protection has resulted in the marginalization of seniors
and intellectuals and the layoffs of many workers. 1 2 In the midst of rapid
social restructuring, Falun Gong condemns the moral corruption of the
contemporary world and advocates detachment from worldly success. Its
transcendent ideals give meaning to suffering. Falun Gong involves a set of
qigong breathing exercises that are believed to strengthen one's mind and
body. These beliefs partly explain why this para-religious or spiritual
group is so appealing to the Chinese public during a time of economic
growth. 114
Falun Gong was founded in 1992 by Li Hongzhi, who was known as
Master Li. Falun Gong, literally translated as "the practice of the wheel of
the Dharma," is a breathing exercise group that claims to inherit the wisdom
of Buddhism, Taoism and Chinese qigong. 115 Falun Gong members
adamantly deny being part of a religion, cult or sect.1 16 Rather, the group
109 After the first mass protest by Falun Gong members in April 1999, Chinese authorities started a
widespread campaign against the group. By the end of 1999, 35,000 members had been arrested. See
Vermander, supra note 13, at 4-6. See also discussion infra Part IV.D.
11o See supra Part IV.A.
11 See David Palmer, The Doctrine of Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong: Between Sectarianism and Universal
Salvation, 35 CHINA PERSP. 14 (2001); Nancy N. Chen, Healing Sects and Anti-Cult Campaigns, CHINAQ.
506 (2003).
112 Chen, supra note 111, at 507-08.
113 For discussion of the teachings of Falun Gong and its successes, see Palmer, supra note 111, at 20-
22.
11 Id. at 21.
115 Li HONGZHI, FALUN GONG, ch. IT, pt. I, at http://www.falundafa.org/book/eng/flg_2.html, (trans.,
4th ed. 2001).
116 See the comments of the Falun Gong spokesperson in Australia, Caroline Larn, quoted in
Religious Tolerance.org, Falun Gong & Falun Dafa, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/falungong.htm,
and the interview with the Hong Kong Falun Gong spokesperson, Jiang Hongzhang. See Xiao Hei &
Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, Po Huai She Hui Ni Huo Dai Dong She Hui Jin Bu?
Zhuan Fang Xiang Gang Fa Lun Gong Fo Xue Hui Fa Yan Ren Jian Hong Zhang [Disturbing Society or
Bringing Society to Process - Interview with Hong Kong Falun Buddhist Organization Spokesperson Jiang
Hungzhang], JUST. & PEACE NEWSL. 14 (Apr. 2001).
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advances Falun Dafa (the Great Law), a spiritual movement that aims to
cultivate one's mind and body and that is based on the motto of "truth,
benevolence and forbearance."'
' 17
After seven years in existence, the Falun Gong made headlines on
April 25, 1999. Ten thousand followers gathered for twelve hours outside
Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound, to protest an academic
journal article that warned of the dangers posed by PRC cults" 8 and the
mounting pressure from the government. 9 China's top leaders were
immediately alarmed because the protest was the largest systematic
gathering since the 1989 Tiananmen student movement. What was more
worrying was that Falun Gong was believed to have attracted tens of
millions of followers, with a network extending from the PRC to the United
States, Canada, Australia and Europe. Falun Gong arguably represents the
greatest internal threat that the Chinese government has faced in the post-
Mao period, and has proven particularly resilient despite the government's
systematic crackdown. 20 Falun Gong's threat to the established Chinese
order is evidenced by the fact that the group continues to mobilize new
members and command undaunted loyalty, despite being outside the
prescribed religious categories and the institutional framework of the CCP
leadership. To the authorities, it does not truly matter whether Falun Gong
is a religious sect or a qigong (breathing exercise) group; in the eyes of the
government, so long as Falun Gong is perceived as having subversive
potential, it must be uprooted. As noted by Vermander, "Falun Gong
epitomizes the subversive potential of any religious, para-religious or
spiritual movement once it escapes from the legal or ideological
framework.'
2 1
D. From an Illegitimate Organization to an Evil Cult
The PRC's anti-cult campaign against Falun Gong gathered
momentum gradually. When the first large-scale silent protest occurred in
117 LIHONGZHI, supra note 115.
118 See Vermander, supra note 13, at 4 & 12.
119 In 1996, the News Publication Board banned sales of Falun Gong publications. See Zhong Hua
Ren Min Gong He Guo Xin Wen Chu Ban Chu Guan Yu Chong Shen You Guan Fa Lun Gong Chu Ban Wu
Chu Li N1 Jian Tong Zhi [News Publication Board, Notice Concerning Publication of the Works of Falun
Gong] (July 24, 1996 & Aug. 16, 1996), at
http://www.chinainfobank.conflrisBin/Text.dll?db=FL&no=26247&cs-9732689&str (last visited Dec. 1,
2003).
120 Falun Gong claims to have 70 million members in China and 30 million overseas. The official
figure is estimated to be around 3 million members.
121 Vermander, supra note 13, at 7.
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April 1999, the authorities did not immediately condemn the group as an evil
cult. Despite the fact that Li Hongzhi called for a dialogue with the Chinese
government on May 3, 1999 while abroad in the United States, and that
silent protests sprang up in Beijing and other major cities in China in June
1999, on July 22, the government took only the relatively minor step of
declaring Falun Dafa Research Society an illegal organization.' 22 However,
by the time that five alleged Falun Gong members attempted to set
themselves on fire in Tiananmen Square on January 23, 2000, the group had
already been labeled an "evil cult."'1 23 In the eyes of the government, this act
of self-immolation only confirmed the official view that Falun Gong
encouraged extreme and suicidal behavior.
Between the April 1999 Zhongnanhai gathering and the ultimate
condemnation by the Chinese authorities in early 2000, a full scale attack on
Falun Gong was marshaled, with the full backing of legal instruments from
the ministries of the State Council,124 the Supreme People's Court and the
National People's Congress. In June 1999, the Chinese Communist Central
Committee established a special "610 Office" to formulate and execute
policies against Falun Gong. 25 The 610 Office is the highest authority to
122 This classification was based on the technical point that Falun Gong had never registered with the
Ministry of Civil Affairs. Ironically, it was the desire of Falun Gong to seek registration and official
recognition that triggered the government crackdown.
123 The People's Daily, the party press, described Falun Gong as an evil cult in October 1999. See
Special Commentator, Fa Lun Gong Jiao Shi Xie Jiao [Falun Gong is an Evil Cult], PEOPLE'S DAILY, Oct.
28, 1999, at 1, at http://202.99.23.245/rmrb/199910/28/newfiles/col_19991028001094_zypl.html (last
visited Dec. 1, 2003).
124 July 1999 was tension-filled in China. The Central Committee issued a formal notice that all
Communist Party members were forbidden from practicing Falun Gong. See Zhong Gong Zhong Yang
Guan Yu Gong Chan Dang Yuan Bu De Xiu Lian Fa Lun Da Fa De Tong Zhi [The Notice from Chinese
Communist Party to All Communist Members that it is Forbidden to Practice Falun Dafa], PEOPLE'S DAILY,
July 23, 1999, at http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/19990723001001_TopNews.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2003). The Ministry of Civil Affairs formally announced that Falun Dafa was an illegal society because it
had never registered. In addition, Falun Gong was allegedly responsible for "illegal activities, propagating
superstition, deceiving the public, inciting and causing public disturbances and disrupting social security."
Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Min Zheng Bu Guan Yu Qu Di Fa Lun Da Fa Yan Jiu Hui De Jue Ding
[Decision of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Banning of the
Research Society of Falun Dafa], July 22, 1999, at http://www.chinainfobank.com (last visited Dec. 1,
2003). The Ministry of Public Security also banned all Falun Gong activities, including the posting of
signs and images, assembly of Falun Gong members, and the spreading of rumors that would disturb social
order. Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Gong An Bu Tong Gao [Decision of the Ministry of Public
Security of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Banning of the Research Society of Falun Dafa],
July 22, 1999.
'2' The office is officially titled the "Office of the Leadership Team to Handle the Falun Gong Issue,"
but is better known as the "610 Office." The name "610" was derived from the date of its establishment.
The office is often compared to a terrorist group. See World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of
Falun Gong, Committee to Investigate the Crimes of China s '610 Office'in the Persecution of Falun Gong,
Feb. 23, 2003, at http://www.upholdjustice.org/English.2/610%20crimes.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
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monitor Falun Gong, and is above the law, the courts, the procuratorial
organs, public security organs and the government.
On October 15, 1999, communicating through its official television
station, Chinese authorities referred to Falun Gong for the first time as "a
cult with heavy religious connotation". 126 The adoption of this label
demonstrates Chinese authorities' escalation of hostility and resentment
toward the Falun Gong. Under the new proclamation, Falun Gong was no
longer merely a group that spread superstition ("mixin ') and belonged to the
comparatively innocuous category of "pejorative, trivializing neologism,"
and "primitive."' 127 In contrast, "cult" ("xie') is heterodoxy, an absolutely
undesirable standing. On October 28, 1999, the People's Daily again
confirmed that "Falun Gong is an evil cult' ' 128 in full detail. The Chinese
government claimed that more than 1400 followers died because they
rejected medication or committed suicide due to their Falun Gong beliefs.
The concepts of "good" and "evil" were used to delineate between socially
acceptable religions and cults, which the government could suppress and
eradicate.
On October 30, 1999, the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress (NPC) colored the terms of the Criminal Code to reflect
this official stance and issued a lengthy interpretation of article 300 of the
Code. 129 The 1997 Criminal Code of the PRC already stipulated that one
who forms or uses superstitious societies or heretical cults, or uses
superstition to undermine Chinese law shall be sentenced to three to seven
years imprisonment. If the circumstances are especially serious, the Code
provides that an individual shall be sentenced to at least seven years of
imprisonment. Those who set up or use superstitious sects and heretical
cults or superstition to deceive people and cause death are subject to the
same penalty. The October 1999 NPC interpretation specified that "heretical
cults, operating under the guise of religion, qigong or other forms" that
"disturbed social order, endanger public health and property, or jeopardize
126 Jin Gong Zhi Chu Jin Cheng Fei Fa Zu Zhi, Bei Jing Xuan Bu Fa Lun Gong Wei Xie Jiao [The
Forbidden Group was First Referred as an Illegal Association, Beijing Announces it as an Evil Cult], SING
TAO DAILY NEWS, Oct. 15, 1999, at http://www.chinainfobank.com (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
127 See Duara, supra note 70, at 76 (discussing the concepts of xie and minxin in the context of the
KMT's attempt to curb popular religion in the 1920s and 1930s).
125 Special Commentator, supra note 123. Because the Peoples Daily is the Party newspaper, this
statement was understood to be the official line.
129 Quan Guo Ren Min Dai Biao Da Hui Chang Wu Wei Yuan Hui Guan Yu Qu Di Xie Jiao Zu Zhi
Fang Fan He Cheng Zhi Xie Jiao Huo Dong De Jue Ding [Decision of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress on Banning Heretical Cult Organizations, and Preventing and Punishing Cult
Activities] (adopted at the 9th Meeting of the NPC, October 30, 1999), at http://www.chinainfobank.com
(last visited Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Decision of the Standing Committee].
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economic development should be severely punished." It also emphasized
that group leaders should bear greater responsibility for the actions of their
followers.130  The Supreme People's Court and the Supreme Procuratorate
breathed specificity into the Criminal Code by defining heretical
organizations or evil cults as those illegal groups that have been found (1)
using religion, qigong or other names as a camouflage; (2) deifying the
leading members; (3) deceiving people by molding and spreading
superstitious ideas; and (4) recruiting and controlling members and
endangering society.131
In November 1999, the Supreme People's Court notified all Chinese
courts that all judicial officers should implement the NPC interpretation
regarding heretical organizations, uphold the party line and apply the law in
the interest of maintaining social stability.'32 On November 30, 1999, the
first case against Falun Gong members came to trial before the Intermediate
People's Court in Haikou. The four defendants were sentenced to two to
fourteen years imprisonment for organizing illegal gatherings and spreading
Falun Gong doctrine. 33 On December 26, 1999, harsher punishment was
passed by the Beijing Intermediate Court, when the four top organizers of
Falun Gong were sentenced to seven to eighteen years imprisonment. All of
the defendants were CCP members and were charged with "obstructing
justice, causing human deaths in the process of organizing a cult and
illegally obtaining state secrets.' 34 Falun Gong estimated that between July
130 Decision of the Standing Committee, supra note 129.
131 Liang Gao Fu Ze Ren Da Xin Hua She Ji Zhe Wen Zheng Que Shi Yong Fa Lu Ni Fa Da Ji Xie Jiao
Zu Zhi Fan Zui Huo Dong [Explanations of the Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's
Procuratorate Concerning Laws Applicable to Handling Cases of Organizing and Employing Heretical Cult
Organizations to Commit Crimes] (adopted at the 1079th Meeting of the Judicial Committee of the
Supreme People's Court, Oct. 9, 1999 & the 47th Meeting of the Ninth Procuratorial Committee of the
Supreme People's Procuratorate, Oct. 8, 1999).
132 Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Guang Che Quan Guo Ren Da Chang Wei Hui "Guan Yu Qu
Di Xie Jiao Zu Zhi, Fang Fan He Chang Zhi Xie Jiao Huo Dong De Jue Ding" He Liang Yuan Si Fa Jie Shi
De Tong Zhi [Notification by the People's Supreme Court on the Implementation and Judicial
Interpretation on the "Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Banning
Heretical Cult Organizations, and Preventing and Punishing Cult Activities"], at
http://www.chinainfobank.com/IrisBin/Text.dll?db=FL&no=27889&cs=7410613&str-- (last visited Dec. 1,
2003).
133 Zui Gao Ren Min Jiang Cha Yuan Gong Bao, Bei Gao Ren Song Yue Sheng, Chen Yuan, Jian Si
Long, Liang Yu Lin Zu Zhi, Li Yong Xie Jiao Zu Zhi Po Huai Fa Lu Shi Shi, Tao Tuo Yi An [Supreme
People's Procuratorate, Concerning the Case of Defendants Song Yuesheng, Chen Yuen, Jiang Shilong,
Liang Yulin Organizing and Making Use of Evil Cult to Break the Law], Nov. 30, 1999, at
http://www.chinainfobank.com/IrisBin/Text.dll?db-FL&no=45690&cs-9144552&str- (last visited Dec. 1,
2003).
'13 Po Huai Fa Lu Shi Shi Zhi Ren Si Wang Fei Fa Huo Qu Guo Jia Mi "Fa Lun Gong " Xie Jiao Ju
Zhi Yi Fa Zhi Cai [Breaking the Law, Causing the Death of Others and Stealing State Secrets, the Prime
Organizers of Falun Gong were Sentenced According to the Law], PEOPLE'S DAILY, Dec. 27, 1999, at
http://search.peopledaily.com.cn/Detail.wct?SelectlD=6697&ReclD=l I (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). The
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1999 until the end of 2001, 6000 members were sentenced without trial,
100,000 were sent to re-education camps, and several thousands were sent to
mental asylums. 135
Chinese legal studies scholars have criticized the Chinese
government's response as excessive. Kelly Thomas argues that the
protection of national security would not have justified the government's
response to Falun Gong activities.' 36 Randall Peerenboom further points out
that it is a serious violation of the rule of law for the Supreme People's Court
to instruct lower courts to abide by the party line and to reject civil cases
involving Falun Gong.
137
E. In What Sense is Falun Gong "Evil"?
The repression of Falun Gong demonstrates the CCP's intolerance
towards an emergent populist movement whose spiritual appeal rivals the
state ideology. Its reaction further proves that a group's doctrine is often
irrelevant because the state defines a group's "evilness" according to its
ability to challenge the established authority. The fact that Falun Gong is a
newly emerging fringe group in high tension with the government makes it
particularly dangerous. What Falun Gong challenges is not orthodox
religious understanding, but the CCP leadership. First, Falun Gong exceeds
the permissible framework without registration. Second, it dares to protest
in large groups to seek a dialogue with the authorities as if it were on equal
footing with them. Third, the group enjoys overseas support to the
increasing alarm of the CCP. The size of Falun Gong's membership, its
efficiency, and its determination to fight back are unprecedented in the
Chinese Communist era. Although it may be true that the group does not
have a formal political agenda, its posture resembles that of an emerging
political group.
The purging of Falun Gong in the PRC not only exposes the
determination of the Chinese government to repress a perceived rival, but
also reveals the problematic concept of freedom of religion under
international law. Human rights jurisprudence marks a definite line between
the seemingly absolute right to freedom of religious belief and the limited
right of manifestation of these beliefs. Regardless of the Chinese
government's ulterior political motives, the crackdown on Falun Gong
convicted members were Li Chang, Wang Zhiwen, Ji Liewu and Yao Jie.
135 See webpage of Falun Gong, at http://minghui.org/gb/death.report.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
136 Thomas, supra note 53.
131 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 91-102 (2002).
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proves that the division between these two concepts is to some extent
arbitrary. The Falun Gong practice may be unorthodox to many. Because
their behavior is questionable and problematic in the eyes of the ruling
regime, the authorities can easily magnify the bizarre effects of such
practices and thus sway public opinion. Legitimacy to suppress the group's
beliefs and its allegedly harmful teachings will thus be grounded. Once
Falun Gong is labeled a cult, it is ousted from the legitimate category of
religion. In doing so, the ruling authorities successfully mobilize and utilize
the popular concept of cult. As a result, protection of religion is
overshadowed and overtaken by alarmist concerns regarding cults.
In its anti-Falun Gong activities, the Chinese government has
effectively directed attention to the cult-like attributes of this group. Falun
Gong fits the common stereotypes of a cult, meeting six of the seven cult
characteristics detailed in Part 1II. 138 Falun Gong is a relatively new group
that claims a long tradition of wisdom, is led by a strong and self-appointed
charismatic leader, requires a high degree of commitment, aggressively
proselytizes, and systematically induces powerful experiences among its
members. True followers do not use medicine, believing that "therapeutic
care only changes the outward form of illness, which actually grows out of a
subtle body in a deep space that is untouched by treatment."'139 The Chinese
government has claimed that more than 1400 followers died because they
rejected medication or committed suicide due to their Falun Gong beliefs.
Armed with this evidence, the government persuasively convinced many
that this group is "evil" because it spreads superstition and encourages
practices adverse to public health. In the end, Falun Gong has been
condemned as an evil cult, not only in the eyes of the rulers but also in the
eyes of a large majority of the Chinese public.
Despite the fact that Falun Gong does not identify itself as a religious
group, possibly due to the narrow interpretation that the PRC adopts for such
groups, its characteristics are closely related to the aspiration of religion.
While it is true that qigong is a slow breathing exercise that is intended to
strengthen one's mind and body, Falun Gong also aims to purify one's heart
and lead one to salvation. Unlike other qigong masters, Li claimed that he
was "initiated into the Great Buddhist Law at the age of four by the Master
of Complete Enlightenment; by the age of eight, he already possessed
immense supernatural powers.' 41 The Fa of Falun Gong also claims to be
'~' See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
139 See Palmer, supra note 111, at 20.
140 Special Commentator, supra note 123.
141 See Palmer, supra note 111, at 18.
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the embodiment of the teachings of the entire cosmos, including those from
Buddha, Dao and all gods, and is only manifested through Li Hongzhi.
142
Those who believe in Falun Gong dedicate themselves to the exclusive
practice of this exercise as a means to achieve enlightenment. 143 In this
sense, manifestation and belief are united. Disciples of Li also focus
exclusively on Li's exercises and writings. It is forbidden "to mix even the
slightest thought of another qigong method"' 44 with Falun Gong and it is
"absolutely forbidden" to read religious and medical classics. 145 Despite the
fact that Falun Gong denies being a religious body, its strong emphasis on
exclusivity, loyalty and salvation qualify it as a quasi-religion.
46
A genuine consideration of a group's religious belief is simply
impossible because every religion or spiritual group has mystical elements.
A close examination of a belief system may only magnify its idiosyncrasies
and provide further grounds for government intervention. However, for
legal instruments to limit ruling regimes to the examination of
manifestations of beliefs, and not the conviction of such beliefs, is equally
inadequate because these concepts are inextricably intertwined.
V. CONCLUSION
Freedom of religion has always been a highly politicized concept. As
illustrated by one scholar, religion consists of a belief in power higher than
man and an attempt to propitiate or please this power. 14 7 Religious belief
naturally overrides secular state authority, and the desire to please a higher
power also implies that state order may have to be ignored at critical
moments. Logically, devout followers of religious groups are likely to
become political dissenters if their beliefs are threatened or are in
fundamental conflict with the existing political regime. The Chinese
government understands the innately defiant character of religious groups
and accordingly views religious groups as competitors for power and
unwilling political subordinates.
142 Li Hongzhi, Falun Buddha Fa, Lecture at the First Conference in North America, (Mar. 29-30,
1998), at http://www.falundafa.org/book/eng/northamerica'htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
143 See Palmer, supra note 111, at 19 (explaining the teachings of the Falun Gong).
'44 Id. See also Li HONGZHI, ZHUAN FALUN [TURNING THE LAW WHEEL] 56-57 (Universe Pub. Co.)
(1999), available at http://www.falundafa.org/book/eng/doc/zflus.doc (last updated Mar. 2000).
145 Palmer, supra note 111, at 20. See also Li HONGZHI, supra note 144, at 115.
'4 See Vermander, supra note 13, at 10.
147 STARK & BAINBRIDGE, supra note 18 (quoting SIR JAMES G FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH
(1922)).
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The merciless crackdown on Falun Gong by Chinese authorities
reflects leaders' hostility towards, and fear of, this group. It does not matter
what the ultimate nature of this breathing exercise group is, nor what it does;
in labeling Falun Gong an "evil cult," the government makes known its
disapproval. "Cult" signifies a label of deviance from the ruler's
perspective. 148 Moreover, "cult" is not only a sentence passed on this group;
it is also a warning to others that no one should be associated with group
members because they are "enemies of the people."
When the Chinese government intervenes and labels Falun Gong a
cult, it reasserts its central position in the lives of the group's followers, who
have already been filled by spiritual conviction. If Falun Gong has
challenged the leadership of the CCP, the government has also attacked the
core beliefs of Falun Gong followers. Thus, the competition for power that
takes place within the mind of each follower parallels the competition of
power between politics and religion in the public arena. This inner struggle
may easily generate a mass response in the public arena. Religious groups
have an inherent sanctioning power on political authority and have a
decisive role in maintaining existing political regimes. While a state can
impose legal sanction on a religious group, a religious group can provide
moral and social sanction for the state.
This struggle between the state and religion is not unique to the PRC.
Nor are the particular implications of the suppression of Falun Gong limited
to China. The Falun Gong controversy highlights the inadequacy of current
international human rights jurisprudence to deal with similar problems
caused by cults or new religious movements. This Article has pointed out
that neither freedom of religion nor the conditional right of manifestation of
religion is a reliable legal concept for the protection of groups like Falun
Gong. Paradoxically, the suppression of Falun Gong also reveals how
quickly the Chinese government has used Western human rights ideology to
justify its decisions and to consolidate its power. The ruling regime
strategically moved away from the Maoist strict management mode of
religious control to a flexible containment strategy. China's ruling regime
plays with the human rights rhetoric of public health and morality, and
suppresses Falun Gong in the name of anti-superstition, secularization and
modernization, with the full use of existing legal instruments.
In sum, Falun Gong represents not only a mass revolt against
governmental control in the PRC, but also a resistance "with Chinese
14' Although Tsai did not discuss the concept of the cult, he presented an interesting analysis on Falun
Gong within the context of Emile Durkheimn's deviance and labeling theory. See WEN-HuI TSAI, CLASS
STRUGGLE AND DEVIANT LABELING IN MAO'S CHINA 246-49 (Edwin Mellen Press) (2001).
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characteristics" against the dominant Western mode of "religious freedom."
The Falun Gong debate calls into question international standards and the
human-rights based ideology. Until the tension between religious belief and
its manifestation can be satisfactorily resolved, we will continue to witness
state manipulation of freedom of religion in order to subvert religious
groups.
